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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The Utah Adoption Council is a private, nonprofit organization representing 
licensed child-placing agencies, adoptive parents, and adoptees throughout the State of 
Utah. Its purpose is to advocate and maintain sound adoption law and policy for the 
benefit of all persons involved in the adoption process. By stipulation of the parties, the 
Utah Adoption Council submits this amicus brief to assist the Court in addressing the 
issue raised by petitioner in this original action: Whether due process requires personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident unwed father to adjudicate the father's rights in relation to 
a newborn child relinquished for adoption. 
Petitioner takes the position that his rights cannot be adjudicated in the absence of 
minimum contacts with this forum state, regardless of actual notice of a possible adoption 
and an opportunity to assert his rights. Essentially, petitioner asserts that the adoption 
cannot proceed without his consent, forcing the Utah adoptive parents to adjudicate his 
rights in North Carolina, presumably under North Carolina law. Petitioner demands a 
Utah court ruling in his favor without submitting to the jurisdiction of Utah courts. 
However, a nonresident father cannot thwart a determination of his parental rights by the 
simple ploy of refusing to appear in a Utah court. 
Under well-established law, due process does not require a Utah court to acquire 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident unwed father prior to determining his rights in 
relation to a newborn child relinquished for adoption. Such a proceeding falls squarely 
within the recognized "status exception" to standard minimum contacts analysis. In a 
series of adoption decisions over many years, Utah appellate courts have determined that 
due process rights of nonresident unwed fathers are adequately protected as long as the 
father knows the mother is in Utah, and Utah statutes provide a fair and reasonable 
procedure for the father to assert his rights. Neither this Court nor the United States 
Supreme Court has ever required a showing of minimum contacts with an absent parent 
before a status determination regarding the parent's child can be made. Such a 
requirement would, for practical purposes, prevent or unduly delay the process for all 
interstate adoptions. A child cannot be left in legal limbo while efforts are made to 
identify, locate, and appease an absent unwed parent. Rather, the state's compelling 
interest in the prompt determination of child care and custody matters, including 
adoption, requires all parties to adhere precisely to statutory procedures designed to 
protect their rights and facilitate final resolution in the best interests of the child.1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As an unwed father of a newborn child, petitioner has no vested paternal rights 
without strict compliance with statutory procedures. Due process requires only that 
1
 While leaving the merits of this particular case to the parties, the Adoption Council 
questions the wisdom and efficacy of addressing an issue of such importance by way of 
this original mandamus petition. In the absence of a trial court proceeding, this Court has 
no factual record and is deprived of the benefit of a trial court analysis and ruling. 
Petitioner's statement of facts includes no record documentation and conflicts in material 
respects with the adoption agency's statement of facts. Apparently, no discovery has 
occurred, leaving petitioner's factual averments untested by cross-examination. Plainly, 
petitioner is seeking an extraordinary writ as a substitute for established statutory 
procedures and appeal. If this procedure proves successful, other putative fathers will 
take license to ignore the statutory procedures approved in this Court's prior decisions, 
leading to legal uncertainty and disruption of the established adoption process. 
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petitioner be accorded a fair opportunity to assert his paternity and acquire rights of notice 
and consent. Due process does not require special notice to absent fathers who are 
presumed capable of asserting and protecting their own rights, but fail to do so. Neither 
does due process require notice of applicable statutory procedures. An unwed father who 
fails to comply with statutory requirements forfeits all paternal rights, including rights of 
due process. 
Even if petitioner could, by any theory, show vested paternal rights, minimum 
contacts would still not be required for a Utah court to adjudicate those rights. The 
minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident does not apply to 
adjudications of a child's legal status in relation to a parent. This "status exception" to 
minimum contacts is recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court and has been consistently 
applied by state courts around the country. The status exception also applies to cases of 
interstate adoptions, as adoption is inherently a child custody determination. 
Accordingly, a father whose child is relinquished for adoption in another state is required 
to appear and have his paternal rights adjudicated in that other state, under the law of the 
forum state, without regard to minimum contacts with that state. A contrary rule would 
unduly complicate and delay the interstate adoption process, preventing prompt and final 
determinations of a child's care, or allowing a nonresident father to ignore legal actions to 
determine his rights in another state, while his child remains indefinitely in legal limbo. 
Utah statutes provide a balanced and fair procedure by which unwed fathers, 
including nonresident fathers, can assert and fully protect their paternal rights. Under a 
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long line of Utah cases, a nonresident unwed father who knows the mother is in Utah is 
required to comply strictly with Utah statutes in order to protect his paternal rights. No 
showing of personal jurisdiction through minimum contacts with Utah is required. In any 
event, a nonresident father submits to personal jurisdiction by participating in Utah legal 
proceedings designed to obtain relief from Utah courts. In the interest of preserving 
interstate adoptions, the Utah Adoption Council urges that petitioner's request for writ of 
mandamus be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
DUE PROCESS DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF A 
NONRESIDENT UNWED FATHER'S MINIMUM CONTACTS 
BEFORE ADJUDICATION OF HIS RIGHTS REGARDING A 
NEWBORN CHILD RELINQUISHED FOR ADOPTION. 
A. Due Process Rights and Status of Unwed Fathers. 
Any discussion of petitioner's due process rights must begin with a review of the 
rights of unwed fathers generally. The leading case on the adoption rights of unwed 
fathers is Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), decided under a New York paternity 
registration statute similar to Utah's. In Lehr, the unwed father lived with the mother 
prior to the child's birth, but failed to register a claim of paternity to the child, as provided 
by statute, to acquire a right of notice to any adoption of the child. Several months after 
the birth, the mother married a different man, and they filed an adoption petition. One 
month later, the unwed father filed a paternity action to assert his paternal rights to the 
child. The adoption court was informed of the father's paternity action, but finalized the 
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adoption without notice to the father. The father appealed the refusal to vacate the 
adoption, alleging that his liberty interest in a relationship with his child was deprived 
without notice and a hearing, in violation of due process. Id. at 250-55. 
The Supreme Court rejected his claim, observing that "the rights of the parents are 
a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed." Id. at 257. The vested rights of 
a married father, or a father with a folly-developed parent-child relationship, are entitled 
to foil constitutional protection, while the inchoate right of an unwed father is not. 
"When an unwed father demonstrates a foil commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood . . . , his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial 
protection under the Due Process Clause.... But the mere existence of a biological link 
does not merit equivalent constitutional protection." Id. at 261. Due process requires 
only that state law adequately protect the unwed father's "opportunity to form" a folly 
developed parental relationship. Id. at 262-64. As long as a fair procedure is provided 
and the right to receive notice is within the father's control, ignorance of that procedure 
does not excuse noncompliance. Id. at 264. The state legislature may validly conclude 
that "a more open-ended notice requirement would merely complicate the adoption 
process, threaten the privacy interests of unwed mothers, create the risk of unnecessary 
controversy, and impair the desired finality of adoption decrees." Id. 
Neither did the unwed father's paternity action constitute sufficient alternative 
means of satisfying the statute or of demonstrating his interest. 
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The legitimate state interests in facilitating the adoption of young children 
and having the adoption proceeding completed expeditiously that underlie 
the entire statutory scheme also justify a trial judge's determination to 
require all interested parties to adhere precisely to the procedural 
requirements of the statute. The Constitution does not require either a trial 
judge or a litigant to give special notice to nonparties who are 
presumptively capable of asserting and protecting their own rights. [Id. at 
265, emp. add.] 
Thus, the inchoate parental rights of the unwed father, who was a nonparty to the 
adoption proceeding, were properly terminated without prior notice because he failed to 
comply with the statutory registration procedure by which he could have received notice, 
all consistent with due process. Id. 
This Court has followed Lehr in upholding the Utah adoption statute against 
similar due process challenges. For example, in Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 
199 (Utah 1984), the unwed father knew of the pregnancy and proposed adoption, but 
was "equivocal" about asserting his parental rights. He signed and mailed his paternity 
registration prior to the mother's relinquishment, the deadline prescribed by statute, but it 
was not received by the Department of Health until after the relinquishment. This Court 
held that the father lost his parental rights by failing to file a timely claim of paternity. 
The Wells Court reasoned that "an unwed father's right to his relationship with his 
newborn is a provisional right by comparison with the vested right of a parent who has 
fulfilled a parental role over a considerable period of time." Id. at 206. In contrast to the 
father's "provisional right," the state has a "compelling interest in speedily identifying 
those persons who will assume a parental role over newborn illegitimate children. 
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Speedy identification is important to immediate and continued physical care and it is 
essential to early and uninterrupted bonding between child and parents." Id. 
Accordingly, the state is justified in permitting an adoption without notice to an unwed 
father who fails to comply with available statutory procedures to assert his rights. "Due 
process does not require that the father of an illegitimate child be identified and 
personally notified before his parental right can be terminated." Id. at 207. As noted in 
Lehr, such a notice requirement would unduly delay and disrupt the adoption process and 
threaten the privacy interests of unwed mothers. Id. See also Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social 
Services, 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1984) (due process does not require that an unwed 
father receive "actual notice of the statutory requirements for establishing paternal 
rights"); Swayne v. L.D.S Social Services, 795 P.2d 637, 642-43 (Utah 1990) ("actual 
notice is not required prior to termination of parental rights"; "plaintiff should have been 
aware of the need to protect his parental rights by filing a notice of paternity"). 
Based on the foregoing case law, petitioner's parental rights are merely "inchoate" 
or "provisional," conditioned on his timely compliance with statutory procedures to assert 
his rights. Petitioner's rights are even more tenuous than those of most unwed fathers 
because his child was conceived and born within the mother's marriage to another man. 
The husband is the presumed father, requiring petitioner to overcome that presumption 
pursuant to North Carolina law. More to the point here, however, is that, absent 
compliance with Utah law, due process does not require proof of notice or minimum 
contacts prior to adjudication of petitioner's paternal rights and finalization of the 
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adoption. As shown next, even with statutory compliance, which would entitle petitioner 
to notice and consent rights, minimum contacts is still not required to adjudicate his 
rights. 
B. Status Determinations Involving Nonresident Fathers. 
Petitioner argues that, when terminating the adoption rights of a nonresident father, 
due process requires not only the right to notice and a hearing, but the additional element 
of personal jurisdiction over the father, as established by the father's minimum contacts 
with the adoption state. However, the Supreme Court has never required minimum 
contacts as a predicate for status determinations, such as child custody and adoption 
proceedings. 
1. Child Custody. 
Petitioner relies on Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), for the unquestioned 
principle that the minimum-contact standard for adjudications involving nonresidents 
applies to actions in rem as well as to actions in personam. However, in extending that 
standard to actions in rem, the Supreme Court expressly excluded traditional status 
determinations: 
We do not suggest that jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in 
text, such as the particularized rules governing adjudications of status, are 
inconsistent with the standard of fairness. [Id. at 209, n.30, emp. add.] 
Thus, due process does not require a showing of minimum contacts in "adjudications of 
status," cases determining the legal relationship between two persons, such as divorce, 
child custody and visitation, and adoption proceedings. 
8 
Subsequent case law uniformly applies this status exception to child custody 
disputes involving nonresident parents. For example, in Balestrieri v. Maliska, 622 So. 
2d 561 (Fla. App. 1993), a Florida grandmother commenced a child custody and 
visitation proceeding in Florida, naming as adverse party the child's adoptive mother who 
resided in Wisconsin. The mother moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 
because she had insufficient minimum contacts with Florida. Citing the status exception 
in Shaffer, the appellate court held that personal jurisdiction and minimum contacts were 
not required by due process. Id. at 563. "Marriage is a status.. . and so too is the 
relationship of parent and child, whether natural or adoptive. Accordingly the 
Restatement (2d) of Conflict of Laws and legal literature classify child custody 
proceedings and adoptions as status proceedings." Id. at 563. 
The Balestrieri court distinguished Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), 
relied upon by petitioner in the present case, which held that personal jurisdiction is 
required to impose a monetary child support obligation on a nonresident parent. Child 
custody was not at issue in Kulko. "[P]ersonal jurisdiction is not required to make an out-
of-state parent a party to a custody case," as long as the forum court has subject matter 
jurisdiction. 622 So. 2d at 564. The basis for this distinction is that enforcement of a 
monetary obligation requires action or compliance by the nonresident parent, while 
determination of the absent parent's legal status relative to a child requires no action by 
the parent. See also Genoe v. Genoe, 500 A.2d 3 (N.J. Super. 1985) (personal jurisdiction 
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over nonresident parent is not required to modify custody or visitation, but is required to 
modify support obligations). 
Petitioner's reliance on May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), a plurality 
decision, is also misplaced, as it merely held that Ohio was not required to give full faith 
and credit to a Wisconsin custody decree entered without personal jurisdiction over the 
Ohio mother. As the concurring opinion makes clear, Ohio was not precluded from 
recognizing the Wisconsin decree: "For Ohio to give respect to the Wisconsin decree 
would not offend the Due Process Clause." Id. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
This interpretation is commonly applied by the courts. For example, in McAtee v. 
McAfee, 323 S.E.2d 611 (W. Va. 1984), the nonresident mother challenged a West 
Virginia decree awarding child custody to the father, asserting that the court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over her. Discussing May and the status exception in Shaffer, the 
court held that adjudication of child custody "without acquiring personal jurisdiction over 
the absent parent.. . does not violate the absent party's due process rights." Id. at 617. 
See also In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d 107, 117-19 (Ind. App. 1982) (child 
custody determination without personal jurisdiction over nonresident father does not 
violate due process); Martinez v. Reed, 490 So. 2d 303, 306 (La. App. 1986) (personal 
jurisdiction over nonresident parent not required to adjudicate custody rights); Hurlock v. 
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Hurlock, 703 So. 2d 535, 536 (Fla. App. 1997) (personal jurisdiction over nonresident 
parent not required to adjudicate marriage dissolution and child custody).2 
2. Adoption. 
The status exception to personal jurisdiction also applies to interstate adoptions. 
For example, in In re Baby Boy Dixon, 435 S.E.2d 352 (N.C. App. 1993), the unwed 
parents were residing in Virginia when the mother became pregnant. She subsequently 
moved to North Carolina, where she gave birth and relinquished the child to an adoption 
agency for adoptive placement. The agency petitioned for termination of the nonresident 
unwed father's parental rights, but the trial court dismissed the petition, reasoning that the 
father lacked sufficient contacts with North Carolina to satisfy due process. Id. at 353. 
However, the appellate court reversed, citing the child custody exception to minimum 
contacts and the principles in Lehr. North Carolina law provided a statutory procedure 
for the nonresident father to assert his rights, but he failed to take those steps. Therefore, 
the court concluded, "'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' are not 
offended by permitting the petitioner to proceed with terminating the father's parental 
rights in the absence of his minimum contacts with this State." Id. at 354. Thus, 
requiring the nonresident father to assert his rights pursuant to the laws of the adoption 
forum did not violate due process. 
2
 The status exception to personal jurisdiction is codified in the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act, now superseded by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Enforcement Act, which provides that "[pjhysical presence of, or personal jurisdiction 
over, a party or a child is neither necessary nor sufficient to make a child custody 
determination." SeeJJ.CA. § 78-45c-201(3). 
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These same rules also apply to adoption of a married father's children. In In re 
Adoption ofCopeland, 43 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. App. 2000), the father was living with his 
wife and children in Alabama when he killed the wife. Following the father's 
incarceration, the children's maternal grandparents, who resided in Tennessee, took 
custody of the children and filed a petition in Tennessee to adopt the children and 
terminate the father's paternal rights. The nonresident father asserted lack of personal 
jurisdiction based on lack of minimum contacts with Tennessee. The appellate court 
relied on the Shaffer status exception to conclude that permanent custody could be 
adjudicated without minimum contacts. The court rejected the father's attempt to 
distinguish the case on the grounds that any custody determination would result in 
"termination of his parental rights." Id. at 487. 
[W]e find no reason to view a termination of parental rights proceeding 
differently from that of a pure custody proceeding. In both types of cases, 
the court's principal determination is where and with whom a child should 
or should not live. This is necessarily a determination of "status" and, as 
such, it comes within Shaffer's "status exception" to the minimum contacts 
rule of International Shoe. [Id.] 
Thus, whether petitioner has vested parental rights or not, those rights can be adjudicated 
without minimum contacts for the purpose of proposed adoption. 
The status exception is so widely and firmly established in cases of interstate 
adoptions that most courts adjudicate the rights of nonresident parents without specific 
discussion of personal jurisdiction. Implicit in their decisions is the assumption and 
understanding that minimum contacts with the forum state is not required, and that 
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interested parents are required to appear in the forum state and assert their rights pursuant 
to the law of that state. 
For example, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy £,912 P.2d 761 (Kan. App. 1996), 
the unwed parents lived together in Ohio before and during the pregnancy. Prior to the 
birth, the mother moved to Kansas with the intention of placing her child for adoption. 
The father was later informed of these facts, but took no legal action to assert his rights. 
The mother gave birth and relinquished the child for adoption in Kansas, where the 
adoptive parents filed an adoption petition. The father appeared and contested the 
adoption on due process grounds, arguing that Kansas law could not be applied to him, as 
a nonresident, because he could not anticipate the mother moving to Kansas, which 
amounted to "forum shopping" for a state with stricter laws against unwed fathers. Id. at 
766. The court rejected these arguments, holding that Kansas had subject matter 
jurisdiction because of the residence of the adoptive parents and the child, and that 
Kansas law applied to the Kansas adoption petition. Id. at 766-67. "[Requiring an 
unwed father to make substantial efforts to remain in contact with an unwed mother and 
participate in the pregnancy and birth of the child, wherever it occurs, is not an 
unreasonable expectation." Id. at 767. Accordingly, requiring a nonresident unwed 
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father to appear and assert his rights in the forum where the adoption petition is pending 
does not violate due process.3 
In summary, courts may terminate the parental rights of a nonresident father 
without minimum contacts, whether his rights are vested or not, for the purpose of 
allowing adoption. The alternative rule, as advocated by petitioner, would indefinitely 
prevent the court from adjudicating the custody or adoption of a child whose father could 
not be identified or, if identified, could not be located, which is far more common than 
the facts presented here by petitioner. Petitioner's proposed rule would also be subject to 
manipulation, allowing a vengeful or uncooperative father to thwart the best judgment of 
the mother and the best interests of the child by hiding from the adoption jurisdiction or 
moving to a foreign state or country with laws perceived more favorable to the father, and 
demanding that his rights be adjudicated there. Such complication and delay of the 
adoption process would be extremely detrimental to the child awaiting a permanent home. 
In the best interests of children, the forum state must be permitted to adjudicate the rights 
of absent parents without minimum contacts, leaving the responsibility with interested 
3
 See also Mullis v. Kinder, 568 N.E.2d 1087, 1090 (Ind. App. 1991) (Florida father 
required to assert his paternal rights in Indiana adoption proceeding; father's ignorance of 
Indiana law did not violate due process); Hyllandv. Doe, 867 P.2d 551, 556-57 (Or. App. 
1994) (California father was required to comply with Oregon law to contest Oregon 
adoption); In re Adoption ofJarrett, 660 N.Y.S.2d 916, 922-23 (App. Div. 1997) 
(requiring Pennsylvania father to contest New York adoption pursuant to New York law 
does not violate due process); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 701 A.2d 110 (Md. 
1997) (father's paternity action in New York did not establish a right to veto adoption 
under Maryland law). 
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parents to appear and assert their rights. See 1 Adoption Law and Practice § 4.07[3] 
(Hollinger ed. 2002) (personal jurisdiction over nonresident parent is not required to 
terminate parental rights and grant adoption; "insistence on personal jurisdiction as a 
prerequisite to terminating parental rights would be catastrophic, especially in cases that 
involve a father whose identity or whereabouts are unknown") (emp. add.). 
C. Utah Statutes and Cases On Nonresident Fathers. 
As a nonresident of Utah, petitioner claims that his paternal rights cannot be 
adjudicated in Utah without his consent. However, this would accord him a virtual veto 
power over the Utah adoption and essentially force the Utah adoptive parents to 
adjudicate his rights through notice and a hearing in North Carolina, presumably under 
North Carolina law. This procedure would plainly disrupt or delay the adoption process 
and violate the privacy interests of the mother. Moreover, this procedure would result in 
greater paternal rights for nonresident unwed fathers than for resident fathers, who, as 
shown above, have no right to notice or a hearing prior to termination of their rights 
unless they strictly comply with statutory procedures. Such an application of Utah law 
would thus violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection. Properly applied, due 
process results in no greater protection for nonresident unwed fathers than for resident 
unwed fathers. The test is the same for both: whether statutory procedures fairly protect 
their opportunity to assert paternal rights. Utah statutes and case law adequately protect 
the due process rights of nonresident unwed fathers. 
15 
1. Utah Statutes. 
Utah adoption statutes attempt to balance the competing rights and interests 
involved in the adoption of a nonmarital child. The state has a compelling interest in 
determining who will provide prompt and permanent care for the child. The unwed 
mother has a constitutionally protected privacy interest in making her own best judgment 
concerning the long-term care and best interests of the child. She has no legal obligation 
to disclose the identity or other information regarding the father. The child has a right to 
prompt care and permanence and stability in an adoptive placement. The adoptive 
parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interest in continued custody 
of the child. U.C.A. § 78-30-4.12(2), (4). 
By contrast, the unwed father has only an inchoate interest that acquires full 
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood in accordance with applicable statutes. The father is 
presumed to know that his sexual relationship with a woman could result in pregnancy 
and that his child could be placed for adoption. He is presumed to know the law, and he 
has the primary responsibility to protect his own rights, regardless of what the mother or 
anyone else may tell him. If the unwed father fails to grasp his opportunity for paternal 
rights in strict compliance with statutory requirements, his inchoate interest may be lost, 
and the adoption may proceed without according him any right of notice or consent. 
U.C.A. §§ 78-30-4.12(2)(e), (3); 78-30-4.13(1); 78-30-4.14(5); 78-30-4.15(l)-(3). 
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An unwed father may acquire a right to notice of the adoption or a right of consent 
to the adoption by complying with statutory requirements. Any unwed father, regardless 
of residence, is entitled to notice of the adoption if he has a right of consent, if he has 
commenced a paternity action and filed notice of the action pursuant to Utah law, if he is 
named on the birth certificate, or if he is openly living with the child and holding himself 
out as the child's father at the time of relinquishment. U.C.A. § 78-30-4.13(2). Any 
unwed father of a child under six months old, regardless of the father's residence, 
acquires a right of consent to the adoption (a veto power) by commencing a Utah 
paternity action, filing notice of that action with the Utah Department of Health, and by 
paying pregnancy and birth expenses according to his ability, all prior to the mother's 
relinquishment. U.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(l)-(2). 
The statute also provides specific protections for nonresident unwed fathers who 
have no reason to know the mother is in Utah, and therefore, may not fairly be expected 
to comply with Utah law. If the unwed parents reside in another state, and the mother 
comes to Utah without notifying the father, and the father has failed in reasonable 
attempts to locate the mother, then the father may protect his rights through compliance 
with "the most stringent and complete requirements" of his own state's law. U.C.A. § 78-
30-4.15(4). However, as demonstrated by case law, if the nonresident father knows the 
mother is in Utah, this provision does not apply, and the father is required to comply with 
Utah law in order to assert his rights. 
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Accordingly, Utah adoption statutes provide fair and reasonable means for a 
nonresident unwed father like petitioner to fully protect his paternal rights. He has no 
need to bypass our trial courts and seek an extraordinary writ by original action in our 
appellate courts. This Court and the court of appeals have repeatedly upheld this 
statutory framework as applied to nonresident unwed fathers. 
2. Utah Case Law. 
The leading Utah case dealing with a nonresident unwed father is Ellis v. Social 
Services Dept, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980). The unwed parents were California residents 
when both learned of the pregnancy. Several days prior to the birth, the mother came to 
Utah without informing the father. Following the birth in Utah, the mother declared the 
father unknown and relinquished the child for adoption. Several days later, upon learning 
of the mother's actions, the father commenced a paternity action in Utah. The trial court 
dismissed the action because the father failed to register his claim of paternity prior to the 
mother's relinquishment, as required by Utah law. This Court reversed, holding that if 
the father did not know the mother was in Utah, he could not reasonably be required to 
comply with Utah law; therefore, the statute would violate due process, as applied to this 
father. Id. at 1256. The Court remanded to allow the father "to show as a factual matter 
that he could not reasonably have expected his baby to be born in Utah." Id. In reaching 
that conclusion, however, the Court observed that "[i]n the usual case, the putative father 
would either know or reasonably should know approximately when and where his child 
was bom." Id. In such cases, notice of the need to comply with Utah law is "necessarily 
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implied." Id. n.16. Thus, the Court properly assumed that a nonresident father who 
knows the mother is in Utah is subject to adjudication of his rights under Utah law 
without a showing of minimum contacts. 
In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 111 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986), follows Ellis on 
similar facts. Again, the nonresident parents resided in California, and the mother moved 
to Utah during the pregnancy. When the father came to Utah to visit, the mother 
informed him that she would move with him to Arizona prior to the birth. In reliance on 
that assurance, the father went to Arizona to make living arrangements. While he was 
gone, the mother gave premature birth and relinquished the child for adoption in Utah, 
where an adoption petition was filed. Upon learning of the mother's actions a few days 
later, the father returned to Utah, registered his paternity, and moved to dismiss the 
adoption petition. Id. at 687-88. This Court held that because the father reasonably 
believed his child would be bom in Arizona, where he had gone to find a home, requiring 
his compliance with Utah law "was contrary to basic notions of due process." Id. at 691. 
However, the Court noted that, on its face, the statute sufficiently "affords [nonresident] 
putative fathers the opportunity to assert and protect their rights." Id. The Court 
reaffirmed that "actual notice is not required prior to termination of parental rights," and 
that "[n]otice requirements may be satisfied when necessarily implied, i.e., in the usual 
case where the putative father knows or should know of the birth and can reasonably take 
the timely action required to avoid the statutory bar." Id. at 691 (citations omitted). 
Therefore, a nonresident father who knows or should know that his child could be 
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relinquished for adoption in Utah is deemed to know of the need to assert his rights 
pursuant to Utah law. No additional showing of personal jurisdiction through minimum 
contacts is required. 
More recently, in In re Adoption o/B.B.D., 1999 UT 70, 984 P.2d 967, the unwed 
parents were Washington residents. The mother informed the father that she was 
traveling to Utah to give birth and place the child for adoption with relatives. The father 
opposed the plan, but took no legal action in Utah. Three weeks later, the mother gave 
birth in Utah and relinquished the child to the relatives, who filed an adoption petition. 
The father contested the adoption, but the trial court ruled that he had failed to comply 
with Utah statutes to protect his rights. Id. ^ 8. This Court affirmed, concluding that the 
father "failed to make any attempt to establish legal paternity under the provisions of 
Utah law"; therefore, he lost any parental rights to the child. Id. ^ 12 (emp. add.). The 
father knew that the mother had moved to Utah to place the child for adoption. 
"Nonetheless, he failed to take any action to establish paternity according to our statutory 
scheme; thus, he waived any right to notice and consent." Id. ^ 17 (emp. add.). The 
father specifically argued that Utah lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he had 
no minimum contacts with Utah. This Court rejected that claim, noting that the father 
had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of Utah by participating in legal proceedings 
here. Id. ^ 29. Further, the Court held that the nonresident provision of section 78-30-
4.15(4) did not apply because the father knew the mother was in Utah. Id. ^ 30-33. 
Accordingly, if a nonresident father knows the mother is in Utah, he is plainly required to 
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comply with Utah law in order to protect his paternal rights, regardless of minimum 
contacts.4 
Petitioner relies on the recent court of appeals case, In re W.A., 2002 UT App 72, 
442 U.A.R. 27, cert, granted, 48 P.3d 979, to support his argument that personal 
jurisdiction is required for termination of a nonresident's parental rights. That case is 
distinguishable because it pertains to a father with fully vested rights in an 11-year-old 
child. However, even without those distinctions, W.A. should not be followed because its 
analysis is flawed. The court of appeals curiously acknowledges that the nonresident 
father "has established sufficient minimum contacts with Utah to satisfy due process 
requirements," id. ^ f 13, but then concludes, based on the long-arm statute, that "Utah 
does not have personal jurisdiction over" the father because service of process is not 
available, id. ^  16. The court thus confuses the issue of personal jurisdiction with the 
nonissue of service of process. The court also declares that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
never extended the status exception to termination cases, id. \ 19, but neither has the 
Court ever held the status exception inapplicable to termination cases. As demonstrated 
above, minimum contacts analysis does not apply to a custody determination. Under 
Utah law, a custody determination, which inarguably fits the status exception, has been 
4
 See also Beltran v. Allan, 926 P.2d 892 (Utah App. 1996) (California unwed father 
required to comply with Utah law; no showing of minimum contacts required; ignorance 
of Utah law is no defense, and California paternity action is no substitute); In re Adoption 
ofW9 904 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995) (Indiana unwed father required to comply with 
Utah law; no showing of minimum contacts required; Indiana paternity action is 
insufficient; Indiana court would have no jurisdiction over the adoption or its 
participants). 
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defined to include a proceeding for termination of parental rights. See In re E.H.H., 
2000 UT App 368,19, 16 P.3d 1257 ("a termination of parental rights works the ultimate 
custody and visitation determination as to the party whose rights are terminated"). The 
court of appeals openly acknowledges the compelling cases from other jurisdictions 
applying the status exception to termination of parental rights, but then chooses to follow 
the minority rule, apparently out of concern for the father's fundamental liberty interest. 
Id. fflf 20-23, 35-36. However, that interest is adequately protected through notice and 
hearing rights in the forum state; minimum contacts is not required. The troubling result 
is that Utah is left with indefinite custody of a child whose father is admittedly an unfit 
parent, id. ^ 24, and who has actual notice of the action (and even appeared in the action 
to defend his parental rights), but the state's hands are tied by lack of minimum contacts. 
The W.A. case perfectly illustrates why a state with subject matter jurisdiction over the 
custody of a child must be free to adjudicate parental rights to the child without a showing 
of minimum contacts with the state. 
In summary, a Utah court is not required to establish personal jurisdiction over 
petitioner, through minimum contacts with Utah, prior to determining his parental rights 
regarding a child relinquished for adoption in this state. In today's society, marked by 
family unrest and geographic mobility, a state must be free to resolve the issues of 
custody and care of a child placed here from another state without the formality of an 
absent parent's minimum contacts. A child's mother, who may seek safety or comfort for 
her child in another state, cannot be unfairly restricted in interstate travel or in her 
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judgment of what is best for her child. Here, the mother was free to travel to Utah and 
relinquish her child for adoption. The adoption agency was free to accept custody and 
obtain a judicial determination of petitioner's rights. The district court properly exercised 
subject matter jurisdiction under the Utah adoption statutes and applied those statutes to 
petitioner. Meanwhile, petitioner has failed to seize the opportunity to comply with those 
statutes that would have protected his rights. Therefore, basic notions of fairness are not 
violated by adjudicating his parental rights without minimum contacts. "It is not too 
harsh to require" unwed fathers either to comply with the law that protects their rights, 
"or to yield to the method established by society to raise children in a manner best suited 
to promote their welfare." Sanchez, supra, 680 P.2d at 756. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, in the interest of preserving the interstate adoption of 
children, this Court should either dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, 
or affirm the order of the court of appeals denying the petition for writ of mandamus. 
Respectfully submitted this *Ll day of November, 2002. 
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